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Abstract. Alignment forms the basis of successful communication. It
can be seen as the most efficient means for action coordination of co-
operating agents, covering adaptation processes operating without an
explicit exchange of information states. One critical condition of align-
ment consists of joint attention. We present work on equipping a virtual
human with the capability of reaching joint attention with its human
interlocutor. On the one hand, mechanisms to detect the human’s focus
of attention are employed. On the other hand, basic cognitive as well
as intentional processes underlying the phenomenon of joint attention
are incorporated in our agent’s cognitive architecture. In this context, a
dynamic working memory and a partner model accounting for theory of
mind and intentionality are crucial constituents.
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1 Introduction
In order to build a believable virtual human, we must understand how to model
its cognitive abilities to engage in natural, successful face-to-face communica-
tion. According to Pickering and Garrod [1] successful communication is based
on efficient action coordination and adaptation mechanisms realizing a close con-
nection between the interlocutors. These alignment processes are joined processes
between the interactants allowing them to sufficiently reconstruct the meaning of
the interaction. One central condition of these joint process consists of joint at-
tention. Joint attention facilitates interaction processes and supports inferences
about people’s current and future activities, both overt and covert. It is a foun-
dational skill in human social interaction and cognition and can be defined as
simultaneously allocating attention to a target as a consequence of attending to
each other’s attentional states [2]. However, to distinguish joint attention from
joint perception, Tomasello stresses the intentional aspect of joint attention by
demanding that the interlocutors have to deliberatively focus on the same entity
while being mutually aware of this [3].
We investigate joint attention in an interaction scenario with the virtual
human Max [4]. The human interlocutor meets the embodied conversational
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agent face-to-face in a CAVE-like virtual environment. This scenario allows for
the inclusion of verbal as well as non-verbal communication channels (e.g. gaze
and gestures) for both the human interlocutor as well as for the virtual agent.
After discussing the psychological background of joint attention in the next
section, current research on implementing attentional behavior in virtual hu-
mans and robots will be presented. The essential interplay of intentionality and
attention will be covered in the requirements section. Based on these insights,
our own approach of modeling joint attention in the virtual human Max will be
presented in (Sect 5).
2 Psychological Background
Attention has been characterized as consisting of an increased awareness with
respect to internal as well as external aspects such as perceptions, conceptions,
and behaviors. This awareness can be invoked by involuntary as well as delib-
erate processes [5]. Attention is therefore not a unitary process but a complex
phenomenon. Attention can be defined as intentionally directed perception [3].
Its purpose lies in the allowance and maintenance of goal-directed behavior. Co-
hen et al. [6] follow [7] in assuming three attentional subsystems: an anterior
attentional system concerned with cognitive control and action selection, a pos-
terior attentional system associated with orienting and perceptual attention, and
an arousal system covering alertness phenomena.
During interactions, human attention is modulated by the observation of gaze
direction and by inferences derived from observations. Recent experiments sug-
gest that interacting agents pay as much attention to each other’s intentions as
they do to each other’s observable acts [8]. Hobson additionally underlines that
agents need the capacity of joining one another by sharing an experience and
registering an intersubjective linkage. To reach joint attention, the agents need
to be aware of of the other’s focus of attention as well as of the process of sharing
attention itself [9]. Considering these deliberative aspects of joint attention, the
attentional focus of cognitive control has to be taken into account. Cognitive
control and attention can be seen as emergent properties of information repre-
sentation in working memory [10]. In line with this research, Cowan claims that
the focus of attention is controlled conjointly by voluntary processes (central ex-
ecutive system) and involuntary processes (the attention orienting systems) [11].
Oberauer adopts these ideas seeing working memory as a concentric structure
with its parts being characterized by an increased state of accessibility for cog-
nitive processes: (1) The activated part of long-term memory holds information
over brief periods of time. (2) The region of direct access serves to keep a lim-
ited number of chunks available for ongoing cognitive processes. (3) The focus
of attention itself holds at any time the one chunk being selected for the next
cognitive operation to be applied upon [12].
One of the most comprehensive mod1els of joint attention comes from Baron-
Cohen’s work on autism [13]. He postulates a tiered model containing four mod-
ules including an intentionality detector, an eye-direction detector, a shared at-
tention module, and a theory of mind module. Emphasis is put on the theory
of mind as an endpoint and meta-representation as a process, but thereby some
key relations, especially between attention and intentions are not described [14].
3 Related Work
In the area of virtual humans, researchers have mainly focused on modeling the
perceptional attention focus as well as convincing gaze behavior [15] [16]. These
computational models can be seen as prerequisites for joint attentional mech-
anisms. However, aspects of conjoining the attentional foci of the interlocutors
are not covered.
A number of researchers in cognitive science and cognitive robotics use de-
velopmental insights as a basis for modeling joint attention. They show how
a robot can acquire aspects of joint attention by supervised and unsupervised
learning [2], [17], [18]. However, the aspect of intentionality and explicit repre-
sentation of the other’s mental state are not accounted for in these approaches.
Work on a listener-robot explicitly addresses the issue of joint attention [19].
But in this robot, joint attention is modeled as an unconscious mechanism. The
robot’s behaviors are not subject to deliberate decisions but are implemented by
if-then rules based on the redundancy of the interlocutor’s attentional behavior
and the communication mode. Breazeal et al. [20] work on a robot which is ca-
pable of rich social interactions and is provided with joint attention capabilities
modeled as a collaborative process. The robot has an attention system which
determines its attentional focus by calculating saliency values for all perceived
objects. Additionally, the attention system is used to monitor and represent the
human’s focus of attention by attaching saliency tags to the respective objects.
The robot’s attention following and directing skills can be accompanied by con-
versational policies along with gestures and shifts of gaze accouting for repair,
elaboration, and confirmation of the shared referential focus.
Hence, besides that the robotics community has recently demonstrated an
increasing interest for modeling joint attention, most of the existing models focus
only on partial and isolated elements of joint attention phenomena. They cover
surface behaviors like simultaneous looking or simple coordinated behavior, but
do not address the deeper, more cognitive aspects of joint attention [21].
4 Requirements
Following [21], we understand joint attention as an active bilateral process which
involves attention alternation, and can only be fully understood by assuming that
it is realized by intentional agents. To reach joint attention, the agents must be
aware of the coordination mechanisms of understanding, monitoring and direct-
ing the intentions underlying the interlocutor’s attentional behavior. To this end,
the agent needs to be able to (r1) track the attentional behavior of other agents
by gaze monitoring and has to (r2) derive the candidate objects the interlocu-
tor may be focusing on from observation of the interlocutor’s behavior and the
situational context. Furthermore, the agent has to (r3) recognize, whether the
attentional direction cues of the interlocutor are put out intentionally or not.
This aspect can be covered by keeping a model of the interlocutor’s mental state
with respect to his focus of attention. The agent has to (r4) react instantly,
as simultaneity plays a crucial role in joint attention. When in response to an
attentional direction cue, the agent deliberately draws its focus of attention on
the referred object, it should (r5) use an adequate overt behavior which can be
observed by its interlocutor.
To manipulate the attentional behavior of its interlocutor, the agent should
also be able to engage in proto-declarative pointing, the ability to point in order
to comment or remark on the world to another person. This behavior can be ap-
plied when gaze alone does not suffice. Also verbal references can be constituted
to draw the interlocutor’s attention on a specific object.
5 Modeling Joint Attention in a Virtual Human
Reconciling the requirements and research on joint attention, we propose the
following model of joint attention (see Fig. 1). In order to reach joint attention,
three main aspects need to be considered. Firstly, the agent’s mental state serves
as the origin of the attention mechanisms allowing for intentionally guided be-
havior. To reach joint attention, information covering a partner model which
accounts for the interlocutor’s focus of attention is acquired. This attentional
focus has to be inferred from the interlocutor’s overt behavior. Additionally, the
environmental context is taken into account in order to embrace situatedness.
This is achieved by bottom-up activation processes marking relevant objects as
salient in the current situation. These processes can be seen as the second main
aspect of joint attention. Thirdly, the agent itself needs to display appropri-

















Fig. 1. Model of joint attention
5.1 Cognitive Architecture
Instead of modeling a separate module solely concerned with producing aligned
gaze behavior of joint attention, we want to model the mechanisms behind the
phenomenon of joint attention having their roots in the agent’s cognition. We
extend the cognitive architecture of our virtual agent [4]. In CASEC (Cogni-
tive Architecture for a Situated Embodied Cooperator), ideas of basic cognitive
mechanisms are integrated with explicit representations of mental states. The
CASEC architecture adopts the BDI (belief-desire-intention) paradigm of ratio-
nal agents [22] but additionally incorporates a dynamic memory model being
inspired by work of Cowan and Oberauer (see Sect 2) to account for basic cog-
nitive processes. Instead of static sets of beliefs in which entities have to be
deliberately added and removed, the dynamic model employs automatic activa-
tion and decay processes. The activation values of the entities kept in working
memory represent their saliency in the current context. They can be influenced
by events, internal processing, and by the decision of the agent. In addition to
automatic processes increasing the activation values whenever the object gets
in the agent’s gaze focus, deliberative mechanisms increase the activation values
whenever the object is subject to internal processing. That is, in contrast to at-
tention modeling in form of a stack on which objects are deliberatively pushed,
we model the mechanisms behind attention so that an attention focus emerges
out of the agent’s goals, its behavior, and its interaction with the environment.
As attention is not seen as a unitary process, several attentional mechanisms
are modeled in our architecture. Figure 2 outlines the agent’s working memory.
The rhombi represent relational chunks written into working memory function-
ing as explicit representations of the agent’s beliefs. They descend from visual
and auditive perception processes residing in the phonological loop and the visual
spatial memory. Additionally, relevant chunks can be retrieved out of long-term
semantic memory and are represented together with the agent’s current con-
clusions. Activation impulses are sent by the agent’s perception mechanisms.
Whenever a new object is perceived or refocused, information about it cover-
ing its unique ID and its relevant attributes are written into working memory.
The content of working memory is represented by use of relations which con-
sist of a relation name e.g. color, is a, or inst of together with the respective
attributes. Each of the relation entities has its own activation value. But not
only the salience of the object’s perceptual attributes makes them appear as at-
tractors for the focus of attention. Additionally, when the agent perceives verbal
input referring to an object, the respective activation values will be increased.
Also when the agent notices that another agents focuses on a specific object,
activation impulses are initiated. By this means, the content of working memory
and thereby the candidate set of the agent’s cognitive processes is influenced by
its interlocutor providing the basis for attention alignment processes.
5.2 Attention Detection
As an indicator for the human interlocutor’s focus of attention, we track the
human’s gaze as a basic manifestation of joint attention is gaze following. For
Fig. 2. Model of dynamic working memory
the first requirement (r1) (see Sect 4) tracking the interlocutor’s focus of at-
tention, an eye-tracker is employed. Additionally, the human’s head direction is
tracked by an infrared camera tracking system providing the position of the eyes
relative to the world coordinate system. To (r2) derive the objects lying in the
in the human’s focus of attention, a cone of 2.5 degrees is used. In addition to
the boundary of the cone, activation values of the agent’s working memory are
incorporated in the calculation of the candidate set. By this means, we do not
only take the humans’s line of view into account but also the situational context.
The determination of the selected object is done using histogram calculations.
An object is detected as being in the human’s focus of attention, when it has
been focused at least for a sum of 400ms in a 600ms time frame. In addition to
this heuristic, the use of other communication channels such as pointing gestures
or verbal expressions are interpreted as intentional direction cues. If attentional
direction cues of a certain intensity are detected, the resulting belief is written
into working memory.
5.3 Partner Model
The incorporated partner model covers beliefs about the conversational state
and the conversational role of the interactant. Additionally, the interlocutor’s
attentional focus is represented as beliefs in form of ”attention focus $interlocu-
tor $object” being updated dynamically and thereby leading to new beliefs or
increasing a belief’s activation respectively. However, as only intentional focus-
ing is reckoned as an invitation to joint attention, we follow [19] with respect of
(r3) detecting the speaker’s intention: The intensity of the speaker’s overt behav-
iors are interpreted as indicators for the interlocutor’s intention. The intensity is
calculated by the communication channel used and the redundancy of the inter-
locutor’s attentional direction cues. For the agent to ascribe the desire to reach
joint attention to its interlocutor, we use the following heuristic: An object has
be the focus of attention for several times with additional short glances address-
ing the agent inbetween (triadic relation). Otherwise the interlocutor may just
be focusing on the object with respect to other than interactional aspects. When
the activation value of an attention-focus-belief passes a threshold and the inter-
locutor has shown interactive glances, the agent believes ”achieve $interlocutor
attention focus self $object” leading to an (iv) instantaneous activation of a con-
clude-plan. Thus the agent becomes aware of the interlocutor’s intention and
decides how to respond e.g. gazing at the same object to reach joint attention.
5.4 Attention Manipulation
While the attention detection mechanisms can be seen as prerequisites for engag-
ing in joint attention, the agent also employs (r5) pro-active mechanisms to ma-
nipulate the interlocutor’s focus of attention. Being an embodied conversational
agent, the agent deploys different attentional direction cues e.g. intentional gaze,
deictic gestures, and verbal expressions [4]. The agent’s mental state is modeled
using the BDI paradigm. Besides the explicitly represented beliefs, intentional
states are represented as explicit goal states together with the means to achieve
them. In case of the agent’s goal to reach joint attention, the agent represents
an explicit goal ”ACHIEVE attention focus $interlocutor $object” and pursues
a plan in order to draw the interlocutor’s attention toward the same object it is
focusing on. When deciding which mechanism to use, the agent relies upon its
plan library, usually adopting the plan with the least involved effort (e.g. gaze).
If no suitable reaction of the interlocutor is perceived, more obvious attentional
direction cues are applied. The plans are only carried out for as long as the goal
state has not been achieved. As soon as the agent believes ”attention focus $in-
terlocutor $object”, joint attention is achieved and the agent turns to the next
goal of its agenda. Also, when the top-level goal which led to the instantiation of
the joint-attention-goal is achieved or dropped, the joint-attention-goal is auto-
matically abandoned. In case of not achieving joint attention, the failure part of
the plan catches leading to a verbal expression making the agent’s goal explicit.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
We presented work on equipping our virtual human Max with capabilities of joint
attention. To this end, perception and detection mechanisms have been proposed
and the processing in the agent’s cognitive architecture has been presented. In
future research, we want to evaluate how the model of joint attention is approved
by naive human interactants. Additionally, we want to explore how parameters
of joint attention mechanisms (e.g. timing, explicitness, intensity) can be tuned
to adapt to the interactant’s reactions applying for alignment processes.
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